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ABSTRACT
This article argues that civil-military relations should be conceptualized not only in
terms of democratic civilian control but also for effectiveness in implementing a
spectrum of roles and missions. It also argues that achieving effectiveness requires
institutional development as a necessary but not sufficient condition. Currently in
Latin America, the focus in civil-military relations remains exclusively on civilian
control. While there is a growing awareness of the need for analysis beyond assert-
ing control over the armed forces, so far nobody has proposed or adopted a broader
analytical framework. This article proposes such a framework, and employs it to
analyze differences among four major South American countries: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, and Colombia. The explanation for the differences identified by use of the
framework is found in the incentives of civilian elites in Chile and Colombia, who
have recognized serious threats to national security and defense.
In comparison to other world regions that have experienced the emergence of newdemocracies in the third wave of democratization, there is a rich and abundant
literature on civil-military relations in Latin America. While this literature, and
more important, the policies it seeks to explain, is extremely good at describing and
analyzing the achievement and exercise of democratic civilian control, until now it
has sought to go no further. Democratic civilian control is viewed as the goal, in and
of itself. Indeed, highly regarded scholars have explicitly argued that control is suf-
ficient. David Pion-Berlin uses the term management of the military (Pion-Berlin
2005, 19). 
Considering the background of misery and trauma caused by repressive military
regimes in the majority of countries in the region, it is not surprising that there is
such an emphasis on asserting and maintaining control over the armed forces. Yet
the focus must be broader, and must include effectiveness, and not only in fighting
wars but also across the broad spectrum of roles and missions in which Latin Amer-
ican security forces—including the armed forces, national police, and intelligence
agencies—are currently engaged. 
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In my work on comparative civil-military relations, I have developed a frame-
work for analysis, and have applied it to new democracies as well as to the United
States (Bruneau 2011). In this framework I define three necessary, but not suffi-
cient, requirements for democratic civilian control, and three for effectiveness in
achieving roles and missions. I have found that unless the three are fulfilled for both
dimensions, control and effectiveness, it is not possible to achieve either. 
Analysis must include whether a country’s security forces meet the require-
ments to be prepared to engage in the roles and missions for which they are actually
used. These roles and missions include preparing for territorial defense (Chile),
preparing for or engaging in fighting insurgencies (Colombia and Peru), preparing
for or engaging in combating terrorism (Colombia and Peru), engaging in peace
support operations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay), engaging in fighting
organized crime and street gangs (Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, and Mexico), and providing humanitarian assistance in the case of natural
disasters (all countries in the region). The relevance and urgency of the fifth category
is supported by results from the respected public opinion surveys conducted by Lati-
nobarómetro, which demonstrate an unrelenting increase in the identification of
delincuencia/seguridad pública as the most important problem of a country (Latino-
barómetro 2011, 33 for the increase between 2007 and 2011 for the region, and 71
for current rate by country).
Analyzing national security and defense entails serious methodological chal-
lenges. Simply rating the success or failure of a country in performing any one of
these roles and missions does not get us very far because, for example, a potential
aggressor may avoid going to war with a country it perceives as too strong militarily
to overcome, while in peacetime support operations and humanitarian assistance in
a natural disaster, mitigation rather than “success” is the most that can be expected.
I seek instead to analyze the requirements to conduct any of these activities. 
With these caveats in mind, and in order to do research and empirical analysis, I
posit three fundamental requirements for democratic civilian control: institutional
capacity for controlling the armed forces, oversight to see that civilian direction is
being followed, and reform of professional military education (PME) to modify the
culture of an armed force in line with a civilian-led, democratic orientation. For the
implementation of roles and missions, I posit the following three requirements: a plan
or strategy that indicates what is intended to be achieved and how to achieve it, central
institutions to implement the strategy (including interagency coordination, as there
are multiple security agencies), and sufficient resources, both financial and human, to
ensure implementation. My argument is that a country must have the institutional
capacity of the first five requirements, and sufficient resources, or the armed forces will
not be under democratic civilian control, or be effective, or neither.1
Some authors are beginning to expand analysis beyond the exclusive focus on
civilian control, but so far, none has put forward a framework for analysis. Without
such a framework, which will allow systematic comparisons, it will not be possible
to describe, let alone explain, variations among countries. The one area of the world
where the policies and analyses of civil-military relations in new democracies have
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gone beyond control to include effectiveness in implementing roles and missions is
Eastern and Central Europe. I therefore begin this article with a discussion of
Europe, to demonstrate that the institutional development and study of civil-mili-
tary relations in a new democracy can include more than control. I then apply my
framework to compare both control over and effectiveness of the armed forces in
four major countries in South America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. 
This comparison demonstrates significant differences among countries. I then
attempt to explain the incentives that have led the democratically elected civilian
elites to create the institutional bases for achieving effectiveness. Using this variable,
the presence or absence of political incentives for civilians to go beyond control to
enhance effectiveness, I elaborate on, and, to a certain extent, qualify the work of
David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas on “attention deficits,” in which they
focus on incentives (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, 2007).
THE EXPERIENCE OF EUROPE
There is a very respectable body of scholarly literature arguing that the new democ-
racies in Europe are different from other new democracies. As Adam Przeworski
wrote in 1991,
Geography is indeed the single reason to hope that Eastern European countries will
follow the path to democracy and prosperity. There is no place in Europe today for
nondemocratic politics; democratic institutions are the sine qua non for any coun-
try that seeks to become a member of this community. (Przeworski 1991, 190) 
Specifically focusing on civil-military relations, Felipe Agüero provides insights
into how the larger institutional framework of Europe influences civil-military rela-
tions. He discusses the importance of NATO membership several times, illustrated
by the following quotation: 
Spain’s incorporation into NATO provided an international impetus for central-
ization and civilianization of top defense structures. Also, the intense debate prior
to the final incorporation helped to expand the participation of diverse civilian sec-
tors in the definition of issues that would have otherwise been left exclusively to
military quarters. (Agüero 1995, 203) 
More recently, Narcís Serra, who was minister of defense in Spain during the
most critical phase of the democratic transition and consolidation, 1982–91, has
made two key points: 
Spanish democracy became solidly rooted when Spain joined the European Com-
munity. On the other hand, membership of the Atlantic Alliance was what most
influenced the professional profile of the military by providing reference points for
modernization and giving anchorage to current and future reforms. (Serra 2010,
139) 
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I have written elsewhere about the impact of NATO on the democratic transi-
tion in Portugal from 1974 to 1994. I learned from interviews with officials at
NATO in Brussels and the Department of Defense in Washington, as well as with
Portuguese civilian officials and military officers in Lisbon, that membership in
NATO and the desired membership in the European Economic Community (pre-
cursor to the European Union) were critical factors influencing the behavior of Por-
tuguese political elites and military officers (Bruneau and Trinkunas 2008, 49–68).
Currently, we can document similar influences in the newer NATO members,
including Romania and Slovenia (Bruneau and Matei 2012, 158–66, 318–30). 
In addition to NATO and the EU, the new democracies that join the Organi-
zation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also commit themselves to
a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. In chapter 7 of the
code, 15 articles concern the military, other security forces, intelligence agencies,
and civil-military relations (OSCE 1994, 1–7).
There are several concrete incentives for political elites in Europe to focus on
civil-military relations, including both control (especially in the EU and OSCE) and
effectiveness (especially in NATO and its Partnership for Peace, PfP program) in the
implementation of a spectrum of roles and missions. In most Eastern and Central
European countries, NATO membership was popular among the population, if only
to establish a link to the West and to minimize the influence of Russia. In some,
including Spain, it was seen as a precursor to joining the EEC, with all of the funding
that was promised. In a sense, the importance of NATO and the rest of the security
architecture in Europe is a legacy of the past, of the Cold War, and current experi-
ences of NATO members in Afghanistan and in the regime change in Libya raise seri-
ous questions about war-fighting viability in the future. But for the purposes of this
article, the imposition of the security architecture, and the incentives that accompany
it, has resulted in both democratic civilian control and effectiveness in implementing
roles and missions in the newly democratic NATO and EU members. 
The scholarly literature regarding civil-military relations reflects these realities
concerning roles and missions, and includes analysis beyond control to effectiveness.
In addition to Narcís Serra’s excellent case study of the democratic transition and
civil-military relations in Spain, there are several books and articles by British schol-
ars. Among the best examples are the studies by Andrew Cottey et al. in, for example,
“The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military
Relations” (2002), in which they argue that the traditional civil-military literature,
which they characterize as “distorted, narrowed, and sometimes confused by a con-
ceptual focus on ‘democratic control’ of armed forces,” must be reconceptualized
(2002, 31). The title of one of Timothy Edmunds’s many articles, “What Are Armed
Forces For? The Changing Nature of Military Roles in Europe” (2006), nicely cap-
tures the changes, and the recognition among analysts that there is indeed change. 
These authors have expanded the focus of civil-military relations studies
beyond democratic control and territorial defense to include most areas of national
security and defense and to encompass not only the armed forces but also national
police forces and intelligence agencies. In sum, the institutional configuration of
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civil-military relations in Europe, which is heavily determined by the extensive web
of structures and processes imposed by NATO and NATO’s PfP, the EU, and the
OSCE, includes both democratic civilian control and effectiveness in implementing
roles and missions. And the scholarly literature captures this reality. 
SLIGHT PROGRESS IN INSTITUTIONAL AND
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
In contrast with European developments, until very recently, both the institutional
reality and the literature on civil-military relations in Latin America were limited to
an exclusive focus on asserting democratic civilian control of the armed forces.
There are, however, some recent indications of awareness that an analytical focus
must extend beyond control to effectiveness. Chapters by two of the leading civilian
experts on civil-military relations in Latin America, which appear in RESDAL’s
2010 Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America and Caribbean, are indicative.
In “The Hidden Appeal of Defence,” Rut Diamint argues, 
We do not want the armed forces of the past, but the ones we have got in the pres-
ent seem never to be able to show their usefulness: either because they fail to con-
trol organized crime; or they never end up as entirely reliable political allies; or they
do not provide a service that is needed for state development. (RESDAL 2010, 68) 
In his chapter, “The Ministries of Defence and the Political Power,” Juan Rial
states: “At present, all processes are geared to solving problems of the predemocratic
past, while, on the other hand, new problems are appearing for which there is not
yet a precise formulation of the questions to be addressed and much the less, of
course, their potential answers” (RESDAL 2010, 50). 
This awareness of the need for a broader and more contemporary focus is also
found in a recent publication edited by Alfred Stepan. He proposes to go beyond
control and include effectiveness, while Felipe Agüero and Narcís Serra, who con-
tribute chapters, insist that an analytical focus can no longer be exclusively on the
armed forces but must also include the police and intelligence agencies (Stepan
2009; Agüero 2009; Serra 2009). They further argue that civil-military relations
must be expanded as a concept to include effectiveness as well as control. While
Agüero, Serra, and Stepan point in a promising direction, however, none of them,
nor Diamint or Rial in the  RESDAL atlas, shows how his or her broader concep-
tualization can be employed with empirical data. My goal here is to provide a frame-
work to analyze both control and effectiveness, and to use it to gauge differences
among Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. I selected these four countries
because they are important South American nations, have large militaries and
diverse security forces, and are clearly consolidated democracies. 
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A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
As noted at the outset, in my framework for analysis I define three necessary require-
ments for democratic civilian control and three for effectiveness in achieving roles
and missions. This is a set of minimal requirements, without which I believe neither
control nor effectiveness can be achieved. There are several concerns in logic and
methodology that I had to take into consideration in developing the framework.
First is the difficulty of gaining access to reliable information, and the ability to dis-
cern what is real and what is rhetoric in documents on national security and defense.
In the countries discussed in this article, I have enjoyed access for at least a decade
to civilian officials and military officers, as well as academics and journalists. Second
is the issue of roles and missions. Logically and empirically, it is not sufficient to
focus only on traditional territorial defense and war fighting, since very few coun-
tries fight wars or are prepared to do so. Therefore, analysis must focus on whether
a country’s security forces meet the requirements to be prepared to engage in the
roles and missions that they are in fact used for. 
I posit three fundamental requirements for democratic civilian control: institu-
tional capacity for controlling the armed forces, oversight to see that civilian direc-
tion is being followed, and reform of professional military education (PME) to
modify the culture of an armed force in line with a civilian-led, democratic orienta-
tion. For achieving roles and missions, I posit the following three requirements: a
plan or strategy that indicates what is intended to be achieved and how to achieve
it, central institutions to implement the strategy (including interagency coordina-
tion, as there are always multiple security agencies), and sufficient resources, both
financial and human, to ensure implementation. My argument is that a country
must have the institutional capacity of the first five requirements, along with suffi-
cient resources, or the armed forces will not be under democratic civilian control, or
be effective, or neither. (The varying fulfillment of these requirements for nine
NATO or PfP countries is illustrated in Bruneau and Matei 2012, 345).
In established democracies, including the United States and the newer democ-
racies of Eastern and Central Europe, all six of these requirements can be identified
and assessed, thanks in large part to the OSCE code of conduct, NATO and EU
membership standards, or, in the case of countries such as Moldova, that do not
aspire to NATO membership, thanks to an enhanced partnership with NATO via
the PfP. 
In Latin America, however, a comparable assessment is impossible to make, as
no norms have been externally stipulated, let alone domestically institutionalized.
The carrot-and-stick incentives that are found in Europe are missing in Latin Amer-
ica. The RESDAL atlas, for example, makes this clear by its virtual lack of attention
to oversight, PME, and strategy. What I can do is analyze the resources and powers
of civilian-led ministries of defense, which capture institutional capacity for both
control and oversight in the control dimension and implementation in the effective-
ness dimension. These, combined with PME and strategy, the latter for the effec-
tiveness dimension, are necessary elements, but not of themselves sufficient, to guar-
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antee civilian control and military effectiveness. The commitment of resources as a
percentage of GDP is dealt with separately, as it is a critical but not an institutional
capacity dimension. 
The centrality of a ministry of defense (MOD) to control is widely appreciated,
and is captured by Serra: “The creation of a ministry of defence is crucial in the
process of reducing military prerogatives inasmuch as it is the key means for estab-
lishing the supremacy of civil society” (Serra 2010, 120). Agüero also describes the
importance of the MOD for Spain’s democratic transition: 
Critical to success [of reforms in civil-military relations] were the expanding formal
prerogatives of a minister who had full support in Congress to pass legislation that
would shape the major contours of reformed institutions for defense. The reorgan-
ization of the ministry and the creation of the Defense Staff unleashed functional
dynamics through which the military-as-central defense structure helped advance
the goals of the civilian leadership against the resistance of the military-as-institu-
tion. This centralizing impetus was aided by opportunities provided by the debate
around, and integration into, NATO. (Agüero 1995, 214) 
Serra writes with great authority about the MOD, which he regards as the cen-
tral institution for military reform; which in turn, for him, includes both control
and effectiveness.
Striking a balance between controlling the military and maintaining discipline on
the one hand, and inspiring motivation and necessary collaboration in order to
construct and apply a new framework of relationships on the other, is one of the
most difficult challenges in a period of consolidation. (Serra 2010, 153)
Fortunately, there is good material on ministries of defense in Latin America by
both individual researchers and institutions (e.g., RESDAL; Bruneau and Goetze
2006; Radseck 2005; Pion-Berlin 2009). There is also a current initiative, based
largely in Argentina, to study Latin American MODs.
Interviews with officials in the four countries have given the author a reasonable
awareness of reforms in PME in the region, and the presence or absence of docu-
ments on strategy is relatively easy to determine. PME is relevant because it can be
seen as a way to change the military (or police and intelligence) culture. Although
changing institutions, including the MOD, is relatively straightforward, it can take
a generation to change a culture, whereby the military accepts and possibly respects
civilian control. It must be emphasized that the discussion below should be taken in
terms of “a work in progress.” In Argentina, the lack of activity, and therefore
progress, in institutional development is clear. In Brazil, there is a current initiative
to create a think tank in the MOD to produce analyses and engage civilians in pol-
icymaking in national security and defense. Although in Chile and Colombia much
of the progress is very recent, the antecedents of this progress are clear, and I believe
the trends will continue. Table 1 indicates the findings regarding MODs, PME, and
strategy, through a ranking system described below.
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Table 1 suggests that significant variations exist among the four countries in
South America regarding the institutional requirements for control and effective-
ness. In this context, the term institutional emphasizes that a real, functional system,
not just words on paper, has been created to achieve either democratic civilian con-
trol or effectiveness, or both (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938). My goal here is to put on
an empirical basis something that the researcher can identify as being present or not.
The ratings are determined by the following: 
1. For the ministry of defense, the ratings, from 0 to 3, express whether the min-
istry has a foundation in organic law or similar legal instrument, whether there
is a career track for civilian professionals, and whether the MOD is staffed
with knowledgeable civilians. In the absence of a solid legal foundation and
knowledgeable civilians, it is hard to imagine how an MOD can command
either respect or obedience from the armed forces and implement a strategy,
should there be one. 
2. For professional military education, the ratings, 0–2, show whether civilians
have exerted their influence or control over military education and whether
the PME is joint in orientation. 
3. For strategy, the ratings, 0–3, show whether there is a national security or
defense strategy, a mechanism to evaluate the achievement of stated goals, and
a link between strategy and resources. Thus, the maximum score a country can
receive in these three areas is 8. 
EXPLANATION OF THE RATINGS IN
FOUR SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES
I believe that the variables presented above are sufficiently concrete to usefully
describe and compare civil-military relations in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and
Colombia.2 With regard to the critical issue of resources—the percent of GDP a
country devotes to its military—only Chile and Colombia devote a significant
amount of GDP to defense. According to SIPRI, the percentages for 2010 were
Argentina 0.9 percent, Brazil 1.6 percent, Chile 3.2 percent, and Colombia 3.6 per-
cent (SIPRI 2012).
150 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 55: 4
Table 1. Institutional Requirements for Control and Effectiveness
(1) (2) (3)
Robust MOD PME Reform Strategy Total
Argentina 1 2 0 3
Brazil 1 1 1 3
Chile 2 2 1 5
Colombia 3 2 2 7
Argentina
The ratings for Argentina in table 1 are 1, 2, and 0. The MOD receives a 1 because
it has a legal basis in the 1988 Law on Defense, but little more. It is indicative of the
overall challenge of reform in national security and defense in Argentina that the law
that was passed in 1988 was not implemented until June 2006, by President Néstor
Kirchner, in Decree Law 727/2006. He did so to strengthen the MOD, so that the
minister could define defense policies, make appointments, promote military person-
nel, and begin to open the door for civilians in the MOD. The law also took powers
away from the chiefs of the services and defined the powers of the joint staff. 
While many civilians apparently are employed in the MOD, the agency actu-
ally offers  no specific career track for them, nor are they knowledgeable profession-
als. The most acute insights into the actual functioning of the Argentine MOD
come from material created by Germán Montenegro, who served as vice minister of
defense between 2006 and 2010. He notes two main problems with democratic
civilian control based on the MOD (Montenegro 2010). First, with some 700
employees, the MOD is the smallest of the ministries in Argentina, with responsi-
bilities over 75,000 personnel in the armed forces. Furthermore, despite efforts by
past and present civilian leaders in the MOD, there is no specialization whereby
civilians can develop their expertise and make a career of it. The turnover among
these civilians is tremendous, and every time I visit the MOD in Argentina, I con-
front a new group of mostly young civilians engaged in “on the job training.”
Michael Radseck’s observation is still accurate for Argentina: “As everywhere in
Latin America, Argentina lacks a career path for civil servants in the Defense Min-
istry such as would be important for establishing continuity of civilian expertise”
(Radseck 2005, 190). I will later update this observation with regard to Chile and
Colombia. 
Argentina rates a 2 in PME reform. In an interview, Dra. Sabrina Frederick,
subsecretary for education in the MOD, explained that her office was reorganizing
military education, bringing it under civilian control, cutting down the number of
educational institutions, and creating a joint senior war college, the Escuela Superior
de Guerra Conjunto (Frederick 2009). In attempting to keep track of the changes,
her plan appears to have been implemented, as I verified in visits in April 2010 and
September 2012. In addition to the specific PME institutions, the MOD also has
under its control the National Defense School, now headed by Germán Montene-
gro, which brings together both military officers and civilians for a program in strat-
egy. The hope is that the civilians will ultimately find positions in the MOD. Over-
all, then, Argentina is reforming PME with the intention both to economize
resources by consolidating schools and programs and ultimately to allow civilians to
influence the content of education. 
Argentina does not have a national security strategy. After much fanfare, with
study groups and seminars involving international experts, the MOD finally com-
pleted a Libro blanco de la defensa in late 2011. While very impressive in its size (401
pages) and pictorial presentation, the document does not pretend to be a national
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security or national defense strategy. It is rather something of a tourist guide to the
Argentine defense establishment. And, as noted above, Argentina spends only 0.9
percent of GDP on defense. 
In sum, while Argentina shows some emphasis on institutionalized control,
with a total of three points out of a possible five, it puts minimal emphasis on effec-
tiveness, with a score of 1 out of a possible 5 (MOD and strategy), compounded by
minimal spending levels. The nominal rating for effectiveness is not surprising, as
the Argentine military, in line with Decree Law 727/2006, limits the roles and mis-
sions of the armed forces to external defense against a state actor. Legally, then, the
Argentine military is not designed to be effective in most currently imaginable roles
and missions. 
Brazil
Brazil’s ratings are 1, 1, and 1. The MOD was established 14 years after Brazil’s
democratic transition with the passage of Complementary Law No. 97 on June 9,
1999. A complementary law requires the support of both houses of the Brazilian
Congress and then the signature of the president. Between its creation in 1999 and
the appointment of Nelson Jobim as defense minister on July 25, 2007, the MOD
was under weak and erratic leadership, and did not develop as an institution. Since
the demission of Nelson Jobim by President Dilma Rousseff on August 4, 2011, the
MOD has been headed by Ambassador Celso Amorim, who was foreign minister
during the two Lula da Silva administrations, 2002–10. Ambassador Amorim is a
highly regarded bureaucrat, but he has no background in defense and national secu-
rity. Even under the relatively powerful Jobim, however, a civilian cadre of advisers
was never established. The MOD offers no career track or the required concurso
(public academic competition) to fill open positions, with the result that the role of
civilians in the MOD cannot be enhanced. For these reasons, Brazil scores only 1 of
a possible 3.
PME is recognized as high quality in Brazil, and is provided through an elabo-
rate system at several levels. The three service academies concentrate on technical
training; further professional training, as well as policy and strategy, are offered in
the three war colleges; while a strategic level of education is available at the very tra-
ditional Escola Superior da Guerra (Higher War College), in which senior military
officers mix with civilians. As civilian education has for decades been regulated rig-
orously by the Ministry of Education, for the past few years, civilian and military
education has been approximated, in part due to the Pró Defesa program of funding
for joint education and research. Absolutely no joint education exists, however; the
idea is staunchly opposed by the senior leadership in all of the services, who will not
allow their prerogatives in education diminished. 
In December 2008, the MOD formulated and President Lula da Silva decreed
the Estrategia Nacional de Defesa, or END (National Defense Strategy) (Brazil, Min-
istry of Defense 2008). In this category, therefore, Brazil receives a 1. However,
because the END was created by decree and thus, according to the Brazilian legal-
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administrative system, did not go through the Brazilian Congress, there is no impli-
cation that the congress funds it. To be linked to funding, it has to be passed as at
least an ordinary law or a complementary law. In addition, the END does not
include any reference to implementation beyond purely bureaucratic measures.
In terms of resources, 1.6 percent of Brazil’s GDP was dedicated to national
security and defense in 2010. Plans for the Brazilian navy to purchase new ships, an
item highlighted in the END, were put on hold in 2011. Brazil has yet to decide on
the next generation of supersonic fighters it will buy, despite discussions on this
topic that have continued for at least a decade.
In sum, when it comes to building institutions in national security and defense,
Brazilian policy is balanced and consistent: it scores 1 across all three dimensions.
This is in line with the negotiated and careful approach Brazilians take in virtually
all areas of national security and defense. They emphasize neither control nor effec-
tiveness. In essence, the military is left alone to do what it does; there are no major
disruptions or issues to confront; the relevant documents are not guiding or
demanding; and the country contributes a minimum amount to maintain the armed
forces and keep the equipment functioning. 
Chile
For Chile the ratings are 2, 2, and 1. The Chilean MOD has gradually taken on
authority and competence, and is now developing institutionally. The legal basis
was finally established, following a five-year process in the Chilean Congress, by the
Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of Defense, in December
2010 (Law 20.424, 2010). Even before the law passed, four or five highly qualified
civilian advisers had served as an “executive staff” to the minister of defense, thus
fulfilling the second requirement for a functional MOD. Following from the
December 2010 law is an organic law, which was approved by the Contraloría, for
staffing the MOD. With the passing of the law, Chile is a 3. 
PME also receives a 2. The quality of PME in Chile is outstanding. There are
three service academies, three command and general staff colleges, and the Academia
Naconal de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos (ANEPE, National Academy of Political
and Strategic Studies) for higher-ranking officers, mainly at the 0–6 (colonel) level,
and civilians. Through the increasing role of the Ministry of Education in PME, the
civilian authorities are gradually changing the culture of the military.3 There are ele-
ments of jointness in the intermediate colleges, and clearly in ANEPE, which is
under the MOD and has a civilian academic as vice director. ANEPE is also provid-
ing education in defense and security matters for civilians.
The White Book of 2010 (following more rudimentary versions of 1997 and
2002) can be considered a national defense strategy. For having a strategy, albeit one
that is still not liked to resources, Chile receives a 1. 
Chile commits 3.2 percent of GDP to national security and defense. In fact, the
1989 Organic Law of the Armed Forces stipulates that the defense budget may not
fall below the absolute amount of 1989. It should be noted that debates are ongoing
BRUNEAU: CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY 153
in the Chilean Congress regarding the copper law (Chile, Camara de Diputados,
2012). The fact that the military still receives a percentage of the foreign earnings
from copper exports, and that it is divided equally among the three services, is due to
the politics of the civilians in the congress and not the putative power of the military. 
In sum, Chile is relatively well advanced in developing the institutions for both
democratic civilian control and effectiveness. Particularly significant is the increas-
ing robustness of the MOD, its role in developing and implementing a national
defense strategy, and the amount of resources committed to defense. Unlike
Argentina or Brazil, Chile does have modern supersonic fighter aircraft (F-16, Block
50), modern frigates, and modern helicopters and tanks. 
Colombia
The scores for Colombia are 3, 2, and 2. I must admit that when I was doing
research and technical advising in Colombia, from 2002 until 2008, I was cynical
about progress in many of these dimensions. A team from the Center for Civil-Mil-
itary Relations was engaged in a project for Minister of Defense Marta Lucía
Ramírez de Rincón that required analyzing the MOD and making recommenda-
tions for improvement.4 In a 2003 meeting, she volunteered, “Colombia has a civil-
ian minister of defense but not a civilian Ministry of Defense” (Ramírez 2003).
Progress was very slow, but finally, by 2011, institutional development had pro-
gressed tremendously. 
The MOD rates a 3, which means that it meets all the requirements for a robust
and functional MOD. The 1991 Constitution first stipulated the requirement for a
civilian minister of defense. The 2003 Democratic Security and Defense Policy of
President Alvaro Uribe strongly emphasizes a central role for the MOD in coordi-
nating national security and defense to implement the government’s counterinsur-
gency policies. The civilians in the MOD, buttressed since the mid-2000s with two
civilian vice ministers, have assumed increasingly larger roles in defining and imple-
menting policy. In 2007 the MOD was further reorganized, and the salaries for
civilians, which had previously been about two-thirds the salaries in other ministries
(because the Colombian MOD was still assumed, even after the 1991 Constitution,
to be staffed by military officers), were raised substantially, thereby permitting com-
petent civilians to specialize in issues of national security and defense and to earn a
decent salary. This is not possible in either Argentina or Brazil. Today the Colom-
bian MOD includes four hundred civilians and six hundred military personnel,
with the civilians taking the lead in policy.
PME in Colombia rates a 2. Thanks in large part to problems encountered
fighting against the FARC, and to the huge infusion of U.S. funds and technical
advice for that fight, there was wide awareness of serious weaknesses in Colombia’s
PME. Consequently, from top to bottom, Colombian PME has been undergoing a
major reform, including better content and instructors. Moreover, counterinsur-
gency operations made it obvious that the Colombian military would have to work
jointly, including with the national police. Thus, in the Colombian War College,
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where all of the selectees for flag and general ranks spend a year, the entire curricu-
lum centers on jointness. Colombia is a U.S. Defense Institution Reform Initiative
recipient, with the focus primarily on PME, in addition to further developing the
MOD.
Colombia also meets two of the three requirements in strategy. The country
indeed has a codified defense strategy, which was very much at the center of military
policy during the latter seven years of the two Uribe administrations (2002–10).
Furthermore, unlike most national security strategies, Colombia’s 2003 policy
includes explicit measures to track success in achieving the goals of the strategy.
Although that strategy lapsed with Uribe’s departure in mid-2010, his successor,
Juan Manuel Santos, previously the minister of defense, is creating a new strategy
through the MOD, which is now headed by Juan Carlos Pinzón, who had previ-
ously been a vice minister in that agency. 
Colombia commits 3.6 percent of GDP to defense. It should be noted that not
only does Colombia receive funds from the United States for its counterdrug and
counterinsurgency programs, but through various taxes achieves a relatively high
rate of investment in defense. During President Uribe’s first term, the so-called war
tax generated $1 billion per year. 
In sum, Colombia has developed an institutionally robust MOD, made major
reforms in PME, developed and follows a strategy, and commits a significant sum
of GDP toward national security and defense. 
WHY CHILE AND COLOMBIA DIFFER
In seeking to explain why Chile and Colombia differ from Argentina and Brazil, and
indeed from virtually all other Latin American countries, in terms of these variables,
what stands out first is their shared emphasis on institutional development in
national security and defense by the civilian political elites. 
Chileans have felt threatened by their neighbors, particularly Bolivia and Peru,
for reclaiming territorial gains made by Chile during wars in the nineteenth century.
In 2008, Peru brought suit for conflicting territorial claims (really a large maritime
zone) before the International Court of Justice in The Hague (International Court
of Justice 2008). Meanwhile, the Peruvian and Chilean media keep the issue alive
at home. The conflict with Bolivia, whose president, Evo Morales, also threatens to
go to the International Court of Justice, is yet more pressing. A constitutional ref-
erendum passed on January 25, 2009 mandates that in 2014 the Bolivian president
must abrogate the 1904 treaty between Bolivia and Chile recognizing the current
borders. While there is some progress in confidence-building measures (CBMs)
between Chile and Peru, with Bolivia there is much less progress, since the Bolivians
want to maintain pressure on Chile regarding access to the Pacific Ocean. 
Colombia’s investments in institutional development, PME, and strategy for-
mulation are due to nearly 50 years of fighting several leftist insurgencies, particu-
larly the well-organized and well-funded (through drug money) FARC. The threat
became particularly acute during the presidency of Ernesto Samper (1994–98),
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when the country was decertified by the U.S. government for its weak antidrug poli-
cies. President Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002) attempted negotiations with the
FARC; by the end of his term of office, they were widely recognized as a failure. In
1998 and 1999, while ostensibly negotiating an end to the conflict, the FARC
launched extensive attacks, persuading many analysts that it was a more capable
armed force than the Colombian military (Serafino 2001, 10). 
Alvaro Uribe was elected president on a “law and order” platform in the first
round of voting in May 2002. On taking office on August 7, 2002, Uribe immedi-
ately declared a state of emergency and used the increased powers to impose a special
tax that was allocated mainly for defense (Cope 2002, 1). President Uribe was easily
re-elected on May 26, 2006 with 62 percent of the vote, 40 percent more than his
nearest competitor, and left office in August 2010. His approval ratings were between
79 percent and 84 percent during his second term. Despite the traditional reticence
of the Colombian civilian elite to become involved in issues of national security and
defense, civilian officials finally perceived that the danger to the country was
extremely serious, and instituted major reforms to several aspects of national security. 
In short, Chile and Colombia have made much greater progress than their
neighbors toward creating the institutional capacity for democratic control and
effectiveness in the security and defense sector and in funding this sector, because
civilian political elites in both countries perceive threats and have incentives to
commit financial and political resources. At a minimum, the incentives are votes. It
is significant that Michelle Bachelet of Chile and Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia
were both elected president of their countries immediately on leaving their ministe-
rial positions in the MOD. I can think of no similar experience in any other South
American country. Elsewhere, the MOD is not a trampoline for political ascen-
dency, but rather a millstone perpetuating political irrelevance. Or, in popular
terms, “defense does not produce votes.” 
THE STATUS QUO ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION
In the rest of Latin America, including Argentina and Brazil, there is no similar set
of political incentives for civilian elites to commit resources, political and financial,
to build institutions dealing with national security and defense. The primary reason
for this lack of incentives was captured vividly in an interview with then–Brazilian
minister of defense José Viegas Filho in March 2002. In response to the question, is
Brazil immune to terrorism? he stated, “No one can say that they are immune to ter-
rorism. But if you were to draw up a list of countries that are vulnerable to this prob-
lem, Brazil would certainly be in one of the lowest rankings. Brazil has no enemies.
There is not one country in the world that hates us or is prejudiced against us” (Cor-
reio Brasiliense 2002, emphasis added). 
Current corroboration for this point can be found in Brazil’s END, National
Strategy of Defense, of 2008, which states in the introduction: “Brazil is a peaceful
country, by tradition and conviction. It lives in peace with its neighbors.” And
under “Guidelines”: “Presently, Brazil does not have any enemies” (END 2008, 8,
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16). If it has no enemies, then why should the citizens vote for politicians who say
they are going to use their political and financial resources for national security and
defense when so many other demands exist in basic socioeconomic areas? 
In most of the region, David Pion-Berlin’s observation is fully accurate: politi-
cal elites lack incentives to become involved in civil-military relations, including
building institutions and committing resources, because they are satisfied with polit-
ical management of the military (Pion-Berlin 2005, 31). While I fully agree with
Pion-Berlin regarding the lack of incentives for civilian political elites to promote
defense reform in most of the region, the situation fits the analogy of a broken clock
being right twice a day. Chile and Colombia are extremely important anomalies,
and any analysis must be able to incorporate their divergent experiences. 
More generally for the region, as long as things remained peaceful, Latin Amer-
ican militaries did just fine, as they did not have to prove themselves. Today, how-
ever, as a very large and increasing percentage of the population identifies crime,
delinquency, and public security as the most important problems facing their coun-
tries, and the security forces could conceivably assume the responsibility to deal with
this huge problem, then civilians might see the need to respond. So far, however,
the conceptualization of civil-military relations, limited as it is to democratic civilian
control, constitutes an intellectual obstacle to this awareness. It is ironic that it is
mainly traditional national security and defense challenges, as perceived in Chile
and Colombia, that provide the motivation to build the necessary institutions to
deal with the problems. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Narcís Serra is very critical of Latin American experiences in his book on civil-mil-
itary relations in Spain (2010), in which he draws extensively on comparative case
studies. While Serra’s book is exemplary as a case study of civil-military relations,
Spain had the advantage of joining NATO and the EEC, and also signed on to the
OSCE Code of Ethics, the epitome of democratic and modern European jurisdic-
tion. In addition, Serra makes a general point that he often repeats: “It must be
understood that passing laws is not enough: one must be sure they are implemented
before proceeding to the next measures.” Specifically regarding civil-military rela-
tions, he states, “As with all aspects of military reform, what is difficult is not to leg-
islate but to implement the letter and spirit of the new laws” (Serra 2010, 156, 192).
But for the exceptions of Chile and Colombia, the security institutions in the
region, and the policies they are supposed to implement, are mainly façades and,
from my experience, are not taken seriously by civilian elites or even military offi-
cers. The question often arises if statements or supposed commitments in the areas
of national security and defense are really serious at all. 
A recent example will illustrate this point. In Brazil, the government issued the
END, National Security Strategy, by decree in 2008. It focuses a great deal on
defense of the “green” and “blue” Amazons. The former refers to the Amazon rain-
BRUNEAU: CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY 157
forest, and the latter is the maritime area where the major oil discoveries are located
(END 2008, 10, 14). The strategy, however, has two problems. The first is the
undeclared nature of the enemy; it is hard to imagine any other country coveting
these areas enough to go to war, let alone have the capability to do so. The second
problem, particularly regarding the blue Amazon, is the lack of funds for Brazilian
naval vessels to do anything about defending this area, where the only imaginable
“invader” would be the United States, and that in itself is unimaginable.
Other examples of the failure to ground policy and law in reality, so that they
can in fact be implemented, can be found in virtually all countries in the region. No
informed person can or, I believe, does take the rhetoric of military preparedness
and reform in Latin America seriously. In my view, only in Chile and Colombia can
the military and other security forces effectively respond to actual threats and chal-
lenges. Some other countries, including Brazil, could get there, but so far the civilian
elites do not perceive sufficient political incentives to commit anything but the most
minimal, largely formalistic resources. 
CONCLUSIONS
In Europe, primarily due to the conditions for entry into NATO and the EU, the
institutional requirements for both democratic civilian control and achieving effec-
tiveness in selected military roles and missions are present. The scholarly literature
on civil-military relations in that region reflects the need to go beyond a focus on
control and to include the requirements for also achieving effectiveness. In Latin
America, there is an abundant literature on civil-military relations, but it is exclu-
sively concerned with control. While there are some hints of a recent awareness of
the need to expand this focus, there has been no framework for doing so. 
In this article I have proposed a framework and illustrated it with data from
four South American democracies. I demonstrate that there are indeed variations
among countries and seek to explain the causes of the variations in terms of political
incentives for the elites in Chile and Colombia. In all other Latin American coun-
tries, the incentives for the elites to commit resources, either political or financial,
to increase military effectiveness are minimal. There are simply no votes in defense. 
This argument is important to both the U.S. government and the recipients of
several U.S. foreign assistance programs in national security and defense. In my
view, the likelihood of these programs’ success, beyond the nebulous justification of
“engagement,” is minimal. Without clear political incentives, it is hard to imagine
why any country, aside from Chile and Colombia, would be interested in commit-
ting energy, political capital, and its own resources to the areas of national security
and defense and civil-military relations. 
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NOTES
1. For information on the author’s bona fides for developing and applying this frame-
work see http://www.globalacademicprofessionals.com Track Record
2. For an approach that follows the general conceptualization of this article but can be
done with more generally readily available data, see Flisfisch and Robledo 2012.
3. The author participated, as an international member, on the Ministry of Education
accreditation team for the Chilean Military Academy in October 2006. It was clear that one
of the main goals in the process was to assert civilian control over military education and to
ensure that this education was supportive of democracy. 
4. The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) is located at the Naval Postgradu-
ate School, Monterey, California. Since 1994, CCMR has been conducting research, educat-
ing officers and civilian officials, and advising governments on democratization and civil-mil-
itary relations in countries around the world.
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